SpaceXAI (formerly xAI and Cursor) launched Grok Bot in early beta late Tuesday, as a joint product preceding the full merger of the two companies. With an impressive slick UX design, Grok Bot acts as an enterprise-focused suite of persistent, always-on AI agents designed to act as digital coworkers rather than traditional chat prompts.

Users interact with Grok Bots as they would a human coworker via desktop or mobile apps.

Every Grok Bot gets its own cloud-hosted computer environment (a virtual machine). This allows them to operate 24/7 without stalling or relying on your local machine being powered on. Equipped with a browser, filesystem, and terminal, instead of relying strictly on formal APIs or webhooks, the bots can sign into third-party apps, emails, and websites just like a human user.

Bots complete multi-step workflows end-to-end without requiring clean APIs or MCP integrations, returning only when human approval is needed. Users can complete a task once while letting a Grok Bot observe the workflow. The bot saves the procedure as a repeatable routine, learn user preferences (such as writing style), and executes it autonomously on a schedule or trigger.

Users can deploy multiple specialized bots that share the same cloud environment, messaging each other in threads or group chats to handle complex, parallel tasks such as a Chief of Staff bot managing specialized lane bots for sales outreach, bug triage, expenses, or operations. The bots pass context and coordinate among themselves, bringing humans in only for final sign-offs or high-level judgment calls.

Unlike traditional automation tools that require complex setup, Grok Bot allows users to assign tasks via natural language chat, leveraging its ability to learn from live demonstrations of user behavior.

Initial access is restricted to high-tier subscribers of SuperGrok Heavy, Cursor Ultra, and Cursor Teams Premium. The system is available on macOS, Windows, Linux, and iOS (Android support upcoming), with an enterprise waitlist available for broader organizational deployment. 

Grok Bot was originally developed internally at SpaceXAI to automate routine internal operations, including engineering bug repros, marketing campaigns, customer support, and sales pipeline management. The release represents the company's strategic push beyond consumer LLM chat (Grok models) into enterprise autonomous agent execution—often referred to as "digital labor."

At the end of the NATO summit on July 8, 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump secretly departed Turkey, aboard a small military jet reportedly after being smuggled off Air Force One in an airport catering truck, an elaborate deception operation triggered by an Iranian assassination threat.

"I go by Secret Service and the military" Trump told the media Tuesday responding to the reports. "They wanted me to go on a different flight, a different plane... I do what they say... I guess there was a threat out there. I didn't really ask too much about it. I get a lot of threats."

Unconfirmed intelligence reportedly shared by Israel indicated a plot to shoot down the presidential plane using shoulder-fired missiles, prompting the Secret Service to move the president to an unmarked Air Force C-32A while the older Air Force One served as a decoy with journalists and staff still on board.

Footage captured by the news media at the Ankara Esenboga Airport shows a staircase on one side of the legacy Air Force One and the catering truck on the other, with its container elevated to the level of the plane. Trump arrived in a limousine, climbed the staircase and waved toward the tarmac as he boarded.

After publicly boarding the legacy blue Air Force One in view of cameras and speaking to reporters, Trump and a small group of aides entered a hydraulic catering vehicle raised to a rear door on the opposite side of the aircraft.

The catering truck drove across the tarmac to the waiting C-32A, which flew under the call sign "Reach 18" with its transponders off to RAF Mildenhall in the UK. Upon landing, Trump was secretly transferred back to the main Air Force One to disembark in front of photographers, maintaining the illusion that he had flown on the decoy plane the entire time.

The blue-and-white C-32A, a modified Boeing 757 used to transport U.S. government officials, had been flown to Turkey along with the legacy Air Force One and the former Qatari jet to support the president’s visit. Like Air Force One jumbo jets, it is emblazoned with the words “United States of America” and can be used to transport the president or vice president. But it typically does so with the “Air Force One” or “Air Force Two” call sign, not a nondescript moniker.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth boarded the C-32A separately using external stairs, reportedly part of an attempt to make the flight appear typical. Hegseth flew with Trump to Britain on the same plane.

The assassination threat emerged during heightened hostilities between the U.S. and Iran following American strikes inside Iran, with Trump previously saying he was Iran's "number one target."

Although the president had announced on Truth Social that he would fly the older jet "for old time's sake" instead of the new Boeing 747-8 gifted by Qatar, the actual switch to the smaller military aircraft was kept secret from most White House staff and the traveling press corps, who were asked to lower window shades during the departure.

After greeting U.S. service members at RAF Mildenhall, the president embarked on the newly gifted Air Force One to travel back to Washington, with staff and press aboard after a transfer from the legacy Air Force One, at about 11:01 p.m. A social media post from the White House posted that night said that Trump had landed at the British base “aboard the former Air Force One,” and included a picture of the legacy plane.

Aboard the new Air Force One, Trump spoke to journalists for about 15 minutes, highlighting the threat Iran poses but not acknowledging the deception operation that had occurred earlier.

Though the 747 jumbo jets that carry the president are commonly referred to as “Air Force One,” the term is technically an air-traffic-control call sign for any plane on which the president is aboard. In this instance, however, the president’s whereabouts were obscured on the C-32A flight to Britain using the nondescript call sign “Reach 18” or “RCH18.”

Asked why reporters had been instructed to lower the window shades on the plane in Turkey, Trump said that it was “because you’re probably on a dangerous flight because of the sleaze bags that we have to deal with.” The president said that he has a “threat all the time” against his life, and that he is “number one” on Iran’s “list.”

“But if I go, you go. Right?” Trump suggested to reporters. “Perhaps someday you want to change professions.”

“As the President has said recently, there are many enemies of America who have their sights on him, and we use every tool at our disposal to address those threats,” White House communications director Steven Cheung said in part in a statement.

Ronald L. Rowe Jr., a former acting director of the Secret Service, said that the president’s protection is paramount and that the details of his movements are shielded for good reason. “We need to keep the ‘secret’ in Secret Service,” Rowe said, now with the Chertoff Group, a security advisory firm. “The public should know what the president is doing on a daily basis, but when it comes to the methods by which the Secret Service keeps the president safe, that should remain out of public view.”

According to former US officials, there have been other times in the last 30 years when Air Force One served as a decoy for the president because of a serious threat or because he was flying to a dangerous location. The legacy jet is highly secure, but also highly visible, so putting the president on an alternate plane instead can be considered safer, officials say.

Cameras on Royal Navy K3 Scout surveillance drones were discovered transmitting data to a Chinese IP address, raising significant security concerns despite official denials of a data breach.

The incident involves K3 Scout uncrewed surface vessels, a $16 million (£12 million) fleet supplied by British defense contractor Kraken Technology Group and used by the Royal Marines and Special Boat Service (SBS) since March 2026.

The K3 Scout model, designed to carry a 600 kilogram(kg) payload and operate continuously for 30 days, has also been purchased by the US Special Operations Command and has participated in Nato trials in the Baltic.

The vulnerability originated in third-party cameras containing Chinese-made components, which were sent to the drones with assurances of security and compliance with the US National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

During a routine cyber vulnerability assessment, analysts detected that these cameras were sending automated "heartbeat communications"—small data packets confirming the devices were online and functioning normally—to an unauthorized IP address in China. The Ministry of Defense (MoD) subsequently cut internet connectivity to the cameras to contain the breach.

An MoD spokesman said: “A routine cyber vulnerability assessment identified an issue affecting a Kraken Unmanned Surface Vessel sub-system used by the Royal Navy. A thorough investigation found no evidence of MoD data or systems being accessed, compromised or transmitted externally.

“Our assurance and testing processes are designed to identify and address potential vulnerabilities early, and we continue to undertake routine security activity across our systems and equipment.”

While the MoD and Kraken insist there is no evidence that sensitive military data, reconnaissance imagery, or classified systems were accessed or exfiltrated, the incident has exposed critical flaws in defense supply chain auditing.

A Kraken Technology Group spokesman said: “We are aware that some third-party, NDAA-compliant cameras had a small number of components originating from outside the UK.

“After a full audit by both Kraken and the Royal Navy we are confident no sensitive information has ever been shared outside of intended channels and any potential vulnerabilities have been identified and closed.”

The drones had operated near the SBS headquarters in Poole, Dorset, and were involved in preparations for potential missions in the Strait of Hormuz, leading to fears that metadata regarding operational schedules and locations may have been compromised.

A joint audit by Kraken and the Royal Navy confirmed no sensitive information left authorized channels, but the discovery has triggered calls for stricter component origin checks in military procurement.

Alicia Kearns, the shadow security minister, said: “If we cannot say with confidence what is inside our own military equipment, we cannot say it is ours, or that we are sovereign.

“When cameras built on Chinese parts are found recording our special forces – their faces, training and operations – we should not be surprised, we should be furious that we still haven’t woken up to the realities of the threat we face.”

UK has begun a diplomatic reset with China through a series of high-profile visits to the country, with the hope of lucrative trade agreements. Earlier this year, Downing Street approved plans for a Chinese super-embassy at Royal Mint Court in the heart of London, despite concerns about the site’s proximity to sensitive communication lines.